Community Based Fisheries Management in Bangladesh
Jagannathpur Kole
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Jagannathpur Kole is a channel of the River Padma located in the Kumarkhali and Khoksha Upazillas of Kushtia District and Pabna Sadar Upazilla of the Pabna District. There are 15 project villages with 3,322 households. The FFP intervened here through stocking and the creation of a sanctuary, with the Destitute Child and Human Development Organization (DCHDO) as the implementing NGO. The project water body (PWB) is about 6 kilometres long and 250 m to 1000 m wide. In the wet season, the Kole completely merges with the River Padma but, in the dry season, it is a separate identifiable entity, shrinking to only 200 ha..
The main fishing in the PWB was undertaken by ber jal (seine net) and ragini jal (gill net). While the ber jal (eight units) were used for 8 to 9 months of the year, ragini fishing (24 boats) was done throughout the year. Cast nets were the preferred gears of subsistence fishers; limited use was also made of other minor gears.
Historically, the PWB was controlled by the ijaradars, strongly supported by the ber jal owners. Under FFP, members of the latter group (most of whom have long left fishing), with the backing of local elites including the Chairpersons and Members of the Local Administration, assumed control by capturing the project institutions, particularly the FMC. They then used the FMP to impose a four month fishing ban, from Kartik. The harvest, using ber jals, was taken in Falgun (ragini jal remained banned throughout this period).
Based on this information two villages were selected for in depth study: Gosaidangi, where the owners of ber jal and ber workers are concentrated, and Joatpara, which includes 20 out of the 24 households with licensed boats using ragini and a large number of subsistence fishers. Four stakeholder groups were identified for investigation: ber jal owners and ber workers (both from Gosaidangi) and the ragini and subsistence fishers (both from Joatpara).
We have estimated the production impact of the FFP intervention (stocking with a closed season) first on ber fishing and then on ragini and subsistence fishing. We have found that the increase in catch came mainly from increasing biomass of natural fishes. Increase in stocked fish was marginal (less than half a ton), while natural fish increased by several times.
The FMC took a 40% share of the total catch from the ber owners and a further commission of 3% in its self-appointed capacity as aratdar (fish wholesaler). While 19% of the incremental catch went to the ber owners, the rest accrued to the ber workers.
At the water body level the catch of the subsistence fishers remained more or less the same while that of the ber fishers increased from 70% before the FFP to 84% after the FFP and that of the ragini jal declined from 22% before the FFP to 9% after the FFP. Thus the FFP in the Kole increased catch that accrued to ber fishing only and mainly to the ber owners either on their own right as owners of the ber jals or as members of the FMC or as commission agents.
Total ber fishing time declined by 12% but total monthly ber catch increased by an estimated 43%. Though most of the benefits of the increased catch accrued to a handful of ber owners, there was a 10% increase in income for the ber workers. The ber workers livelihoods are heterogeneous, combining fishing with farming in some cases and work in the brick kilns in others. When specialised ber workers are in short supply, the old and the adolescent boys participate in ber fishing. The ber workers spent increased income on household consumption.
On the other hand excessive fishing in Falgun affected ragini catch in subsequent months. They were gradually allowed access to the PWB from Chaitra but only for a few days. The ragini fishers could return to regular fishing mainly from Ashar, when the PWB merged with the River Padma. Even during this period, the FMC members imposed unanticipated fishing ban on them for a few days in some months. Thus, in the first three months, ragini catch and fishing days declined drastically. Over the year their total fishing time declined by 44%, and catches declined by half. Most of them started to fish in other water bodies and tried to cope against the loss of income from the fishing ban. But our estimates suggest that despite their fishing in other water bodies the ragini fisher lost 28% of their pre-FFP fishing income.
The livelihood impact on the ragini fishers varied. Some are brick-kiln workers who would normally migrate out for work during the fishing ban (6 out of total of 32 ragini households); and these were affected least. In contrast, there were six older household heads, precluded from alternative livelihoods by their frailty, that depended entirely on ragini fishing; they, and their large households, suffered most. They coped by compromising on the size and quality of meals, selling some livestock but they did not have to drop meals. All of them were already very poor and they were dropping meals also before the FFP. There are about 16 households of agricultural labourers who intensified their livelihoods by working more as agricultural labourer. Most of these ragini fishers have some land to fall back on in times of crisis. About half of them managed well while others could not. The severity of impact of FFP on them was, in our judgement, moderate. Some of them complained about reduction in savings, while others complained about having less food, but only sometimes.
Some female members (2-4 households) of the worst hit ragini households took low paid employment. But female members of all the ragini fishers suffered in two important ways. First, since ragini catch declined, the ragini fishers were bringing less and less fish for home consumption. This reduced the quality of food consumed by these households. Second, the long absence of the ragini fishers also pushed the female members to look after household work generally taken care of by their husbands. Now either their husbands were fishing for long hours in other water bodies or working the longer hours required on the farms. This pinched the time available for other tasks (grocery, house repairing and so on). The immediate victims were the children who received less attention from their mothers.
The subsistence fishers come from relatively well off class and they could withstand the shock from the fishing ban.
While the project institutions were captured by the ber jal owners, they were strongly backed by the They somewhat overshadowed the role played by the DOF. The NGO failed to play its role and shamelessly served the purpose of the ber owners. We have not seen them working with the ragini fishers who were the casualties of FFP, rather they were collecting tolls from them on behalf of the ber owner FMC members. The community aspects of the FFP management of Kole are totally missing.
Before the FFP the PWB was controlled by the ijaradars. They were strongly supported by the ber owners. But the ber owners have taken a new role as an ijaradar in the form of the institution of FMC. But this institution is worse than the institution of the ijaradar for many reasons. First, the FMC in effect collected 43% of the total catch whereas the ijaradar was generally taking 25% of the total catch. Second, the ijaradar did not have any stepmother like attitude towards the ragini jal owners. The ragini jal owners still have a high respect for the ijaradars. Third, the ber owners increased their share of the catch from 25% before the FFP to 33% after the FFP. Fourth, they were ruthless to the ragini fishers. The license fee on the ragini fishers were increased during the second stocking. Over time the ber jal owners have been increasing their grip over the project institutions and the PWB.
Having said that, we have to admit that the ber owners were able to enforce a fishing ban that resulted in increased catch. About 143 ber fishing households gained from the project at the cost of loss incurred by about 18 ragini households. The distributional impact of the FFP in terms of number of fishers affected is not large. In fact the number of gainers far exceeds the number of losers. The ber owners were also able to carry on to the second stocking. They could not undertake stocking in the first year of the FFP because it was leased out to a private individual before it was brought under the FFP. The FMC had to finally make a side payment to resolve the deadlock. We also have to remember that it was not a pure redistribution of catch from the ragini fishers to the ber fishers; this redistribution took place in the context of increasing catch. But unfortunately, the ragini fishers could not get the benefits of stocking. The community institutions did not help the losers or did not minimise the costs of the FFP intervention. It is entirely private initiatives undertaken by the ragini fishers that helped them cope with the fishing ban. What helped the ragini fishers was alternative livelihoods and alternative fishing grounds, not an alternative institution. The ber owners cannot claim any success for this, nor does any other project institution. The fact remains, however, that the ber owners were the winner of the FFP game played in the Kole and they took all.