Community Based Fisheries Management in Bangladesh
Bangali River
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The Bangali River is a freshwater river located in the Sariakandi Upazilla of the District of Bogra. The section of this River selected for the FFP is about 7.5 kilometre long, 200 metre wide, and 5-13 metre deep. The FFP intervened here through creation of a sanctuary. TMSS (Tengamara Mohila Sabuj Sangha) is the implementing NGO and there are 11 project villages of 2,740 households.
The PWB never dries up completely but there is no aquatic vegetation in the river. In the dry season, its area is reduced to 130 hectares with more water remaining in the six dohos (deeper, scour holes). Katha fishing in the dohos is the main fishing practice and accounts for as much as 60% of total catch. Ber catch account for about 20% of total catch. A large number of other fishing gears also fish in the PWB. In one of the dohos a permanent sanctuary has been established, while the others have been classified as "temporary sanctuaries". This means they are fished once a year.
Before it was brought under the FFP, the PWB went through two de jure property rights regimes: the leasing system and the open access system. During the leasing system, the entire PWB was leased out as five independent jalkars to three administrative Union-based Fishers' co-operatives who in turn sub-leased them to influential rural elites. These rural elites installed katha in the dohos, with the harvesting being undertaken by professional fishers on a catch sharing basis. These fishers are highly professional and use a set of fishing gears locally known as gulli jal. The sub-leaseholders also collected tolls from the professional fishers in the form of a share of the catch. During the open access system, these sub-lessees were able to retain firm control over the dohos with an unstated understanding with the Fisher' co-operatives and state institutions associated with the PWB. For example, the number of kathas never exceeded the number of dohos - none, other than the former sub-lessees, could install kathas in the PWB.
All indications are that the effect of the project on both fishing practices and the level and timing of effort was marginal and that there was no detectable impact on the productivity of the fishery. The fishing practices of the fishers in the PWB have not changed since the FFP intervention. Techniques of katha fishing remained same, as did fishing with other gears. The sanctuary, which was placed between two kathas in the same doho, was poorly managed and underinvested. As reported by the fishers, catches from the fishing gears used in the PWB remained unaffected by FFP interventions and no new species of fish reappeared. The market study also corroborates this. Neither the amount nor the species composition of the fishes coming from the PWB to the local fish market changed recently. Total catch from the dohos varied from year to year and there is no evidence to show that catch from the dohos systematically increased by the project intervention.
For professional fishers, access arrangements were similarly unaffected: no fishers were excluded from the PWB; the closed season involved no change for fishers; the FMP ban on some fishing gears was not imposed; few fishers paid fees under the licensing system. However there were changes for the former sub-leaseholders. Though they continued to control katha fishing in the dohos, they were required to share the benefits generated.
Since there was little detectable change in production and no substantive change in the type or terms of access for the project's target group, the professional fishers, it must be concluded that the impact of the FFP on their livelihoods was minimal. For the former sub-lessees some reduction in well-being undoubtedly occurred, with corresponding gains for those with whom they shared.
This transfer of economic surplus between richer households outside the target group, which should be viewed as essentially neutral from a project perspective, arose due to the rigid format of the institutional arrangements introduced by the project. These created opportunities for non-fishing elites previously excluded from the fishery.
Seven out of 11 project villages have virtually no fishers. So there was hardly any representation of the fishers in the VDCs constituted from these villages. On the other hand four project villages had no association with the PWB in terms of involvement in katha fishing. As a result the non-fishers from these villages got opportunity to get involved in FFP institutions. Most of the non-fishers from other project villages are the sub-leaseholders and the fisher members of the FMC were silent observers of the development of FFP institutions.
Giving all villages representation on the FMC, guaranteed that representatives from "non-fishing" villages would have an automatic majority. A new elite group, with strong political links either with the ruling party or with the opposition, took advantage of this. These active new elites (henceforth referred to as ANEs) have attended FMC meetings and participated in the management of the PWB. Initially, the FMC went for an all out effort to maximise surplus extraction from the PWB. They helped to arrange katha fishing that used to be mediated by the Fishers' co-operatives. Strong resolutions were made regarding the fees charged on spots allocated for katha fishing and a fourth of katha harvest went to the coffers of the FMC. They also collected license fees for one year. Most of the ANEs have invested in kathas, mainly in co-operation with those sub-lessees who failed to establish a position within the project institutions. Thus the sub-leaseholders of the past now have to share the cake with the ANEs and the Fishers' Co-operative had to make an exit as an institution.
This is the major source of conflict and power dynamics of the FFP institutions, particularly of the FMC. This has not so far resulted in any major tension between the sub-leaseholders and the ANEs. They have the common interest of inheriting the FFP institutions, particularly the FMC, because at the end of the project it would remain the only formal institutional vehicle for establishing rights over the project water body.
Our best estimate indicates that the FMC may have collected around Tk. 170,000 or more from those involved with katha fishing; but the current records of the FMC show a total balance of only Tk. 20,052. The members of the FMC spent this money almost at their own will. Some members of the VDCs have started to question about the transparency of the FMC and about the way they are handling the funds raised from various sources and for various stated and unstated purposes. The ANEs would be the main beneficiaries if FMC funds have been grossly misappropriated.
DOF and NGO appear to have helped the FMC to tighten its grip over the PWB through the project institutions. What was happening to this FFP site was known to DOF and the implementing NGO but we found no evidence that they had made a serious attempt to change the course of these events or help the poor fishers to gain even marginally from FFP interventions.
Thus the impact of the FFP is confined at the institutional level with no impact on catch and on the livelihoods of the fishers. Resource surplus of the former sub-leaseholders is now shared with new claimants; these two groups will possibly have to settle the issue of property rights over the PWB at some stage of the life cycle of the FFP institutions. At this moment these institutions are changing less and trying to maintain a status quo but they could be called anything but community institutions.